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**Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Norway**

**-- 2017 --**

**27-28 November 2018**

This report is submitted by Norway to the Competition Committee FOR INFORMATION at its forthcoming meeting to be held on 27-28 November 2018.

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## 1. Executive summary

1. The Norwegian Competition Authority's goal related to enforcement is to have a clear impact in markets. In 2017, the Authority managed to keep a good balance between a strict, but effective merger control, a growing activity in anti-cartel activities and two major ongoing cases concerning possible abuse of dominance. Some key achievements are:

- Decisions have been upheld on appeal, both by the Ministry in the merger area, and by a landmark decision in the Supreme Court in a case of joint bids in tender procedures by taxi companies.
- In the cartel area, the Authority issued two new decisions resulting in significant fines for the parties involved, and continues working on new cases based on dawn-raids in two cases.
- After issuing the Statement of Objection in 2016 and assessing Telenor's reply, the Authority concluded that the major Norwegian telecom operator created barriers for the development of a third mobile network in Norway, resulting in an all-time high fine for abuse of its dominant position in the Norwegian mobile market. The final decision in the case against Telenor was reached in June 2018.
- In the merger area, one merger was blocked and three were cleared in phase 2 after careful assessment of the efficiency gains related to the merger. Blocked mergers the past years have resulted in alternative buyers ultimately causing enhanced competition in the markets concerned – a good indication the decisions were correct.
- Notably, 96 per cent of mergers for which case handling was finalized in 2017 were cleared within the legal limit of 25 days in phase 1. This is a reflection of efforts to enhance efficient case handling with a focus on front-loading resources in the case – with results obviously of importance for the parties involved as well as freeing internal resources for other prioritized cases.

2. Decisions – and maximum media attention regarding these - are obviously very important to achieve deterrence and compliance. In December 2017, the Authority commissioned a survey to evaluate the reputation of the Authority; business managers' knowledge of competition rules; receive input from business managers' regarding regulations possibly restricting competition; and evaluate the direct and indirect effects of the Authority's work and decisions. The survey clearly documents the deterrent effects of law and the NCA's enforcement: mergers and business practices restricting competition are not carried out or altered to comply with the competition law.

3. However, the survey also indicates that knowledge of the Authority and the law is less than satisfactory, especially for small and medium sized enterprises. Moreover, the survey also reveals that almost 30 per cent of the business leaders in the survey experience or suspect illegal cooperation occurring in the market they operate. This information will steer the Authority's advocacy efforts in the next period.

4. In the advocacy area, the government's decision to consider changes in the regulatory framework for the taxi industry in accordance with recommendations by the Authority was an important step in the right direction.

5. At the international level, some key achievement are:

- hosted a meeting in the ECN Forensic IT working group
- hosted a meeting for the Nordic Cartel working group
- a new cooperation agreement between the Nordic competition authorities was signed, providing a framework for effective cross-border Nordic enforcement cooperation
- the Authority co-chair in the ICN Agency Effectiveness Working Group
- active OECD participation, where the Director General became a member of the Bureau for the OECD Competition Committee

## 2. Changes to competition laws and policies, proposed or adopted

6. The Norwegian Competition Authority's main task is to enforce the Competition Act, prevent and deter competition crime and affect market structure in a direction that promotes healthy competition.

7. The Norwegian Competition Act entered into force on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004. The purpose of the Act is to further competition and thereby contribute to the efficient utilization of society's resources. The Act is to a large extent harmonized with EU competition rules and includes prohibitions against cartels and abuse of dominance. Leniency is modelled after the ECN Model Leniency Program. Mergers and acquisitions are prohibited from being implemented before they have been notified to and reviewed by the Competition Authority.

### 2.1. Summary of new legal provisions of competition law and related legislation

8. The most recent revision of the Competition Act entered into force July 2016. One legal change relates to merger review, which became even more harmonized with EU-merger regulations. The revision also introduced the possibility for settlements in cartel cases, similar to Commission procedures. Companies that have participated in a cartel can settle their case by acknowledging their involvement in the cartel and getting a smaller fine in return.

9. An independent Competition Appeals Board was established in 2017. The Competition Appeals Board is now the first instance to review the NCA's decisions in mergers as well as cartels and abuse of dominance cases. The Competition Appeals Board was officially established 1<sup>st</sup> April 2017. The NCA's decisions after this date must be appealed to this instance. Decisions by the Competition Appeals Board may be appealed to the Gulating Appeals Court (Court of 2<sup>nd</sup> instance) and ultimately to the Supreme Court. Since the Competition Appeals Board is considered an administrative body, the NCA does not have the right to appeal decisions by the Board.

10. As a measure to increase the NCA's independence, the government's (formally: the King in Council) possibility to reverse the NCA's decisions based on public interest considerations was abolished.

### 2.2. Other relevant measures, including new guidelines

11. Since 2014, the NCA has allocated funds for research in competition law and economics. The annual budget for allocations is 6 million NOK (corresponding to

approximately 650.000 EUR). Reference to reports and studies on competition policy issues articles that have been published with support from the fund so far, are listed in the last section of this annual report.

12. In December 2017, the NCA published revised guidelines relating to case handling process in merger cases, to clarify and ensure an effective process to the benefit of the parties involved.

### 2.3. Government proposals for new legislation

13. In 2016, a committee was appointed by the government to review the terms of competition between public and private firms, ie. to what extent existing regulations are competition neutral and comply with EU/EEA state aid rules. The committee delivered its recommendations in January 2018. The NCA sent a hearing statement to comment the report in May 2018.

14. On September 8, 2017, the director generals for the competition authorities of the Nordic countries signed a co-operation agreement between the respective competition authorities. The preceding 15-year-old agreement has now been revised following the OECD recommendation concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and Proceedings of 2014 as well as the EU Council Recommendation /EC) No. 1/2003, and provides for ia. cross-border exchange of confidential information as well as investigative assistance. Some amendments to the Norwegian Competition Act will have to be made before Norwegian ratification.

## 3. Enforcement of competition laws and policies

15. According to the Competition Act, the primary responsibilities of the NCA are as follows:

- Monitor adherence by businesses and industry to the Competition Act's prohibitions against competition-restricting cooperation and abuse of a dominant market position.
- Ensure that mergers, acquisitions and other forms of concentrations do not significantly restrict competition.
- Implement measures to increase the transparency of markets.
- Enforce Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement.
- Call attention to any restrictive effects on competition of public measures and, where appropriate, submit proposals aimed at furthering competition and facilitating market access by new competitors.

16. The NCA can impose administrative fines on businesses for violations of the provisions in the Competition Act. Participation in cartels may also result in criminal charges for the persons involved. Persons that intentionally or with gross negligence violate the competition law may be subject to criminal fines or imprisonment for up to three years. Under aggravating circumstances imprisonment may be extended to six years. In 2016, the NCA published guidelines regarding the use of criminal charges for cartel offences.

### 3.1. Action against anticompetitive practices, including agreements and abuses of dominant positions

17. Activities of the NCA, as in cases that are not decided upon, are summarized first, followed by a description of cases handled by court. Cases that were closed by *decisions* are summarized under '2.1.3 Description of significant cases' below.

#### 3.1.1. Summary of activities

18. In 2017, the NCA secured evidence in three separate cases. The NCA conducted a dawn raid to secure evidence regarding the market for alarm and security services, as well as in the market for waste collection in Mid-Norway. Moreover, a dawn raid was conducted on the premises of a major brewing company related to a possible abuse of dominant position in the market for sale of beer to eateries in Norway.

19. Since 2017, information at an aggregate level on dawn raids the NCA conducts are published on the NCA's website. The information presented are market, type of infringement and status of the investigation.

20. In 2018, the NCA has so far conducted two dawn raids, one concerning the market of books, and the other the grocery market.

21. All cases mentioned above are still in the investigation phase.

**Table 1. Investigative Work Activities 2012-2017**

Cases / locations	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Securing evidence section 25	2/5	1/3	6/17	1/2	1/3	3/3
Depositions (formal statements) section 24	5/10	4/20	4/34	5/45	4/17	4/20

22. In addition to these investigations, the NCA continued its market monitoring in the dairy sector, the wholesale market for electricity, the fuel market, the grocery market and the domestic air transport market.

23. Leniency was introduced by the Competition Act of 2004. The threshold for seeking leniency appears to be relatively low. However, some of the NCA's larger cases have been the result of the leniency program. Notably, in 2017, the amount of leniency applications more than doubled compared to previous years.

**Table 2. Applications for leniency 2012-2017**

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of applications	6	2	3	3	3	7

24. The NCA has adopted a more proactive approach to discover cartels. In that regard, a project on uncovering cartels *ex officio* has been initiated. The project benefits from active participation in the European Competition Network (ECN) Cartel Working Group's project on how competition authorities deal with informants. Parallel to this project, the staff of the chief economist has started projects on cartel screening by

methods that were discussed at the OECD workshop for competition officials in January 2018.

### ***3.1.2. Description of significant cases, including those with international implications.***

#### *Two cartel decisions in 2017*

25. The Norwegian Competition Authority imposed fines totalling 32 MNOK (almost EUR 3.5 million) on four publishers for illegal collusion. In the NCA's view, the publishers Aschehoug, Cappelen Damm, Gyldendal and Schibsted Forlag cooperated in the form of a collective boycott of the distributor Interpress, and exchanged competitively sensitive information. The Competition Authority found that the cooperation had the purpose of restricting competition in the mass market for books. This market includes retail outlets for books that are not traditional bookstores, such as kiosks, grocery stores and gas stations.

26. The Norwegian Competition Authority also imposed fines exceeding 18 MNOK (approximately 2 MEUR) on six undertakings in the electrical installation sector for illegally cooperating on a tender for school buildings in Oslo. Five competitors agreed on identical prices and exchanged other competitively-sensitive information instead of competing to submit the best offer to Oslo Municipality. The undertakings did not try to conceal their cooperation from the procuring authority. The public procurement authority reacted to the cooperation and contacted the Competition Authority.

27. Both cases described above have been appealed. The outcome of the appeals processes thus far are briefly described in section 2.1.3 below.

#### *Abuse of dominant position by Telenor – decision in 2018*

28. In 2017, the NCA received Telenor's reply to the Statement of Objection issued in 2016. In June 2018 the NCA decided to impose a fine amounting to 788 MNOK (EUR 83 million). The fine is record high reflecting that the mobile market is large and important. Telenor has a considerable turnover in this market, and the infringement is considered a serious breach of the Norwegian Competition Act.

29. The case started with unannounced inspections at the premises of Telenor Norge and Telenor ASA in December 2012. Norway is one of the few countries in Europe having only two mobile network providers with nationwide coverage: Telenor and Telia. From 2007 onwards, Network Norway and Tele2 established a third mobile network in Norway. The entry of a third network has been crucial in order to increase competition in the Norwegian mobile market. During the network roll-out phase, Telenor was required to provide access to its network in areas where the third network was not yet present. In 2010, Telenor changed the conditions in its network access agreement with Network Norway, thus reducing Network Norway's incentives to continue the rollout of the third mobile network.

30. Telenor's deadline for appealing the decision to the Competition Appeals Board is by the end of 2018.

### ***3.1.3. Summary of development in cases that were appealed***

31. Before April 1st, 2017, the NCA's decisions to issue administrative fines in cartel and abuse of dominance cases could be appealed to the court of 1<sup>st</sup> instance in the

ordinary court system. Decisions to intervene in merger cases had to be appealed to the Ministry for Industry, Trade and Fisheries. As noted above, the Competition Appeals Board was officially established April 1<sup>st</sup> 2017. The Board shall consider appeals against all decisions and rulings in merger cases decisions issuing fines for abuse of dominance and collusive behaviour (as well as decisions relating to access to file and duty to provide information etc.). Decisions by the Competition Appeals Board may be appealed to the Gulating Appeals Court and ultimately to the Supreme Court.

32. Outcomes against appeals in 2017 are as follows:

33. In 2016, a decision in a merger case in the pizza market (Umoe Restaurants' acquisition of Dolly Dimple's Norge) was appealed to the Ministry. In January 2017, the Ministry decided to uphold the Authority's decision.

34. In a judgment June 22, 2017, the Norwegian Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from two taxi companies against a ruling of the Court of Appeal, thus upholding a decision by the Norwegian Competition Authority concerning the submission of joint bids in tender procedures. The judgment concerned an issue of principle for the enforcement of the competition law: whether co-operation between competitors which takes place openly vis-à-vis the procuring authority can constitute a restriction "by object" in violation of Section 10 of the Competition Act. The judgment made clear that the fact that the co-operation took place openly did not alter the fact that the co-operation was harmful to competition. The judgment also made clear that possible efficiencies resulting from such co-operation must be assessed under Section 10, third paragraph, of the Competition Act as maintained by the Authority in its decision.

35. In addition to an important victory in a case that has demanded significant resources over many years, the outcome also has significant signalling effects, not the least deterring unlawful consortium bidding. In addition, the case has led to increased awareness by procuring authorities to identify potential illegal co-operation by suppliers.

36. In 2016, the Authority blocked Blue Energy acquisition of 39 self-serving gas stations from St1 Norge due to considerations based on insufficient independence between seller and acquirer. St1 Norge was obliged to sell these stations, as a remedial condition set by the Authority in order to approve a previously notified merger. This decision was appealed to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. While the Ministry handled the appeal, the parties renegotiated the deal in order to assure satisfactory independency. Consequently, the Ministry decided to approve Blue Energy as a buyer of the stations.

37. In the first part of 2018, the newly established Competition Appeals Board handled its first case. The case concerned illegal tender collusion between six undertakings in the electrical installation sector (see more details above). The Board upheld the Authority's view that the parties had violated the Competition Act. However, the fines were reduced.

38. Relating to the same case, the parties issued a complaint concerning access to file. Complaints relating to administrative aspects of the NCA's case handling are assessed by the Ministry. The NCA decision to not allow access to internal documents was upheld by the Ministry.

39. In the other cartel decision issued in 2017, also presented in more detail above, Oslo District Court agreed with the Norwegian Competition Authority that the publishing companies Gyldendal, Cappelen Damm and Aschehoug infringed the Competition Act



when they exchanged information and boycotted the distributor Interpress. However, the fines were reduced. In September 2018, two of the parties decided to appeal the outcome to the court of 2<sup>nd</sup> instance.


## 3.2. Mergers and acquisitions

### 3.2.1. Statistics on number, size and type of mergers notified and/or controlled under competition laws

40. The number of notifications of mergers and acquisitions has been quite stable since the threshold levels were increased significantly in January 2014. In 2017, 103 notifications were considered.

**Figure 1. # notifications of mergers and acquisitions**

May 2004 – August 2018 (3 months running average)



41. With the higher thresholds, there is a higher risk that some mergers and acquisitions potentially of concern will not be notified. In order to still be able to follow developments in highly concentrated markets, the NCA has the power to oblige actors in certain markets with high concentration to notify *all* acquisitions, eg. in markets like power production and the groceries market. In 2017, 18 companies in various markets had this obligation.

42. Moreover, in addition to this obligatory notification requirement, the NCA has the power to impose a duty to notify a concentration it has become aware of, if there is reason for concern concerning the effects on competition of the merger. This duty to notify has to be submitted to the parties within three months after the merger contract is signed or carried out (whichever comes first).

43. In addition to assessing notified mergers, the NCA monitors mergers that previously had been approved on conditions. In most of these cases a monitoring trustee, appointed by the NCA, makes sure conditions are met.

44. Notably, 96 per cent of notified mergers were cleared within the legal limit of 25 days for phase 1. This is a reflection of efforts to enhance efficient case handling with a focus on front-loading resources in the case – with results obviously of importance for the parties involved as well as freeing internal resources for other prioritized cases. The average length of the merger reviews was 85 working days for the four in-depth merger reviews that were finalized in 2017.

45. Summaries of the most significant merger cases in 2017 are presented below.

### *3.2.2. Summary of significant cases*

46. The NCA intervened in one concentration in 2017, a proposed acquisition of Nor Lines by Icelandic Eimskip. The merger was blocked, and Nor Lines was bought by Samskip.

47. Three other cases, in the markets for seafood, home delivery of grocery products and telecommunication, were taken to Phase 2. These mergers were not blocked or changed.

48. In December 2017, the Authority notified it would possibly block the establishment of a joint undertaking (Nordic Port Services) by Greencarrier Shipping & Logistics AS, DFDS Logistics AS and Seafront Group AS. In January 2018, the parties announced the merger was abandoned.

49. In July 2017, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries approved of the acquisition of St1 by Blue Energy Holding, after the parties implemented new provisions that, according to the Ministry, ensured the buyer's independency.

## **4. The role of competition authorities in the formulation and implementation of other policies, e.g. regulatory reform, trade and industrial policies**

### **4.1. Cooperating bodies.**

50. The NCA holds regular meetings for information and contact purposes with the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway, the Norwegian Communications Authority, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, the Consumer Authority and the Norwegian Consumer Council.

51. The contact with some of these bodies is formalised by cooperation agreements which ia. provides a better framework to exchange information. Meetings are both on regular and ad hoc basis, depending on whether there are cases where both competition policy and sector based regulations are essential.

52. The NCA has contact with other public institutions depending on priorities in advocacy, e.g. meetings with the Agency for Public Management and eGovernment to discuss possibilities to enhance competition in public procurement.

## 4.2. International cooperation.

53. For the NCA, international cooperation has a high priority; with the Nordic network, the ECN, ICN and the OECD as the most important networks. The NCA aims to be an active contributor to these networks, and submits written contributions for OECD Competition Committee as well as presents cases in ECN Working Groups. In 2017, the NCA also co-chaired the ICN working group on Agency Effectiveness. From 2018, the NCA is a co-chair of the Advocacy Working Group.

54. In addition, the NCA has regular contact with the EFTA Surveillance Authority on ongoing cases with a cross-border dimension. The NCA also has informal cooperation with other authorities on a bilateral basis.

55. The cooperation with the Nordic competition authorities is institutionalised in an agreement, which was revised in 2017. Please see section 1.3 above for more information.

## 4.3. Expressing competition concerns related to existing or proposed regulations

56. Related to advocacy, we work to extend the competition frontier. According to section 9 of the Competition Act, the NCA shall supervise competition in the various markets, ia. by implementing measures to promote market transparency, and by calling attention to any restrictive effects on competition caused by public measures (Section 9e). In its advocacy role, the NCA especially focuses on regulations harming competition.

57. By acting as a hearing body, the NCA ensures that the competition perspective is given due consideration when new policies are being adopted. The Authority prioritises cases where its influence is most likely to result in a positive outcome for competition. This has shown to be an effective use of resources.

58. In 2017, the NCA issued 7 hearing statements expressing concerns related to consequences for competition of proposed laws and regulations.

59. The NCA has for many years advocated the urgent need for regulatory changes in the taxi market. In September 2018, the government proposed changes in accordance with our suggestions.

60. The NCA's advocacy efforts are now focused on the book market where an agreement between the Norwegian Publishers Association and the Norwegian Book Sellers Association stipulating fixed book prices as a mean to achieve cultural policy goals are exempt from the competition law by regulation. An agreement at the branch association level, with a loyalty clause, enhances the NCA's competition concerns even more than if each publisher individually stipulated fixed prices at the retail level. The NCA consider that cultural policy goals can be effectively achieved by more direct measures. Notably, a host of powerful measures are already in place. Furthermore, the NCA argue that competition will pave the way for active use of price to sell more books – new and old, more innovation, new business models and new platforms for the sale and distribution of books in existing and new formats, not the least ebooks and audiobooks.

61. In addition, the Ministry has instructed the Authority to pay particular attention to the retail grocery sector. The market is highly concentrated at both the retail and the wholesale level, as well as for major grocery products. In mid-2018, the NCA was instructed by the Ministry to conduct a market study focusing on ia. market structure and competition in the groceries sector, and to provide input to the Ministry's work to follow

up the Norwegian Parliament's decision to implement measures to enhance competition to the benefit of consumers in this sector.

62. As mentioned above, NCA commissioned a survey among business managers in the winter 2016/17. As part of the survey, the NCA received almost 700 comments indicating regulations possibly restricting competition. This feedback will be assessed throughout 2018 using the OECD Competition Assessment Toolkit as a reference.

#### ***4.3.1. Other outreach activities***

63. The authority has been active in media explaining the importance of solid enforcement of the competition law, and the direct effects of enforcement for consumers. The survey mentioned above indicated that business leaders not have sufficient information on competition law, especially relating to leniency. In 2018, the NCA has several ongoing campaigns to enhance knowledge based on the findings of the survey.

64. The Director General and NCA employees are active in the media, eg. by regular publishing op-eds in eg. the leading national business newspapers and by giving speeches on current issues of concern to the Authority. In 2017, the activity resulted in 17 op-eds and 16 presentations in various fora, as eg. branch association meetings.

65. The Authority received much media attention after the Supreme Court decision in favour of the Authority's decision in the Follo-taxi case concerning the limits for open consortium bidding in a public tender. The Authority has used this window of opportunity to give guidance both to lawyers and companies in the building and construction sector.

66. In December 2017, the Authority was one of the institutions evaluated in a survey among

67. journalists. The survey was carried out by an external agency, and focused on the reputation of selected authorities and comparable organizations. The results show that the Authority has a good reputation and is generally regarded as a trustworthy institution. However, the survey also indicate there is room for improvement, ia. by being even more on the supply side in presenting competition cases to the media and to have a closer contact with media in order to execute its advocacy role even more actively.

## **5. Resources of the competition authorities**

### **5.1. Resources overall (current numbers and change over previous year)**

#### ***5.1.1. Annual budget (in NOK and USD):***

68. The annual budget for the NCA for 2017 was 108 MNOK (approximately EUR 11.6 million).

#### ***5.1.2. Number of employees (person-years):***

69. The NCA's personnel resources amounts to 82,5 person-years, including administrative staff and PR-staff.

70. The Authority had administrative responsibility for the secretariat of Norway's Complaints Board for Public Procurement until April 2017. The staff of the secretariat is not included in this figure.

## 5.2. Human resources (person-years) applied to mergers, anti-cartel, dominance-related issues and advocacy

71. The NCA is organized by sector. Thus, the case handlers are organized in market departments with responsibilities towards specific markets. All case handlers work with all types of competition cases within the markets allocated to the department. In addition, the NCA has an investigations staff with four to five staff members dedicated to investigations in cartel and abuse of dominance cases, as well as international network activities. The staff also includes specialists in forensic IT. The investigations staff supports the market sections in cartel cases.

72. Specialized legal and economic support and quality assurance is provided by the legal director's team and the chief economist's team, respectively.

73. In principle, all case handlers can be engaged in advocacy work. Notably, there is a close cooperation between the department of communications and the other departments to maximize media attention related to outcome of cases and advocacy work more generally.

74. The NCA uses an internal activity-monitoring tool. Administrative tasks and training/competence excluded, resources registered on the different core activities were in 2017:

- Merger review and enforcement: 25 – 30 %
- Enforcement against anticompetitive practices - Anti-cartel: 20 – 25 %
- Enforcement against anticompetitive practices - Dominance-related issues: 15 – 20%
- Other (eg, advocacy): 25 – 30 % - other main activities are advocacy, various requests by the Ministry, market monitoring and international activities.

## 6. Summaries of or references to new reports and studies on competition policy issues

75. In 2014, the government gave the NCA the responsibility to allocate funds for research in competition law and economics in the order of approximately 6 million NOK per year (approximately EUR 0.650 million). Funds were allocated annually. The NCA has since 2017 increased its focus on making the results of the research projects more widely known. Articles based on research projects that are finished are published on the NCA's website: <http://www.kt.no/nb-NO/aktuelt/forskningsmidler/rapporter/>. Articles that have been published in English so far, are listed below:

- When should retailers accept slotting allowances?  
Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen and Bjørn Olav Johansen, University of Bergen, and Greg Shaffer, University of Rochester.  
<http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2018/when-should-retailers-accept.pdf>
- Raising rivals' costs or improving efficiency?  
An exploratory study of managers' views on backward integration in the grocery market  
Hanna Skjervheim Bernes, Isabel Marie Flo, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind,

NHH Norwegian School of Economics

SNF Working Paper No 05/17, SNF project no 9021: “Competition policy and strategy – the interplay between consumers, upstream and downstream market players”

[http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/7\\_2017-raising-rivals.pdf](http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/7_2017-raising-rivals.pdf)

- Upstream Partnerships among Competitors when Size Matters  
Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind, NHH Norwegian School of Economics  
SNF Working Paper No 06/17, SNF project no 9021: “Competition policy and strategy – the interplay between consumers, upstream and downstream market players”  
[http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/6\\_2017-upstream-partnership---ferdig.pdf](http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/6_2017-upstream-partnership---ferdig.pdf)
- Stepwise Innovation by an Oligopoly  
Richard Gilbert, Christian Riis and Erlend S. Riis, University of California, Berkeley, Norwegian Business School and University of Cambridge, respectively.  
[http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/gilbert\\_riis\\_riis\\_stepwise-innovation-by-an-oligopoly\\_may-2017-med-forside.pdf](http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/gilbert_riis_riis_stepwise-innovation-by-an-oligopoly_may-2017-med-forside.pdf)
- Competition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment affect the propensity to issue sickness certificates?  
Kurt R. Brekke, Tor Helge Holmås, Karin Monstad, Odd Rune Straume, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH), Uni Research Rokkan Centre, Health Economics Bergen (HEB). University of Minho.  
[http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/2\\_2017-competition-and-physician-behaviour-med-forside.pdf](http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/2_2017-competition-and-physician-behaviour-med-forside.pdf)
- Competition with Local Network Externalities  
Espen R. Moen and Christian Riis, Norwegian Business School  
[http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/3\\_2017-competition-with-local-network-externalities-med-forside.pdf](http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/3_2017-competition-with-local-network-externalities-med-forside.pdf)
- Exclusive dealing in decentralized markets  
Espen R. Moen and Christian Riis, Norwegian Business School  
[http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/4\\_2017-exclusive-dealing-in-decentralized-markets-med-forside.pdf](http://www.kt.no/globalassets/filer/aktuelt/forskning/2017/4_2017-exclusive-dealing-in-decentralized-markets-med-forside.pdf)
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